Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cc036404b2c4f395…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.2 KB Created: 2021-01-19 08:45:17 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 622079a313506a904c9a7572187c899f SHA-1: d09e27d8edaf2cc3f2a10258cd6f8760bd42f0e3 SHA-256: cc036404b2c4f395dcde00a57f60741a8ec8da62bbe356c7b4c8c44eacd2323d
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with one specifically pointing to a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or to serve further malicious content. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs suggest an attempt to lure the user to external, potentially harmful, sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/wb?keyword=blazing%20star%20rv%20resort%20rates In PDF document text
    • https://soguleta.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134305846/1998892.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gotakavapu/i6ggilA/snowball_io_2_player_games.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/javeduner/jdfsha3/strategic_marketing_planning_tools.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://damomemisogadex.iblogger.org/bhojpuri_holi_dj_video_song.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/rusobotakox/cgdhggd/pixel_worlds_mmo_sandbox_mod_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xoxatazafej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134861408/3599665.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gamaditer.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134583337/pobode_fotapi_mesoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://vebavibokifoko.epizy.com/poburagijonux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vivimaga.epizy.com/petamipojexoruzafozeve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nebejobibaveb.epizy.com/74080402707.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pexodugosa/xaxufulukalipanup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lajefuvubesij.epizy.com/fibalosawepovo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bubisifapagefe/kenixopowolumolowame.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kedogevakubonog.epizy.com/avidemux_linux_ubuntu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pokitudid.epizy.com/11770497444.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/betefowubevat/honeywell_barcode_scanner_sdk_android.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d2d2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD2D2 2960 bytes
SHA-256: a4eee3438a7246650f0a21218a9bc29d7bc7bf1b287bce9df301f714692068dd
font_01_sfnt_off0000dd56.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDD56 5012 bytes
SHA-256: 57ed2822f7a4d66c3cd053e35b5c2e84d24cca15b9375decab076dacfbc66ef0
font_02_sfnt_off0000ee83.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE83 10764 bytes
SHA-256: 9ee2ba36b0ba8827448fbeb2720ac168fb7e20557a0f05b5b182ac9cbc9ab44a

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