Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cbe0c7c7c48d439d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

672.0 KB
MD5: 58564651445edcc5642f117f0615f539 SHA-1: 3b7ebbb16e39099dd2e0d5729cfffe2785e97f16 SHA-256: cbe0c7c7c48d439d8c49570c3d80eb0084202d578273cda146990c574220502a
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file that contains an Equation Editor OLE object. This is a common technique for delivering exploits. The encryption and the presence of the OLE object suggest it's designed to bypass initial security checks and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.