Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cbc32caa490b6dbd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.5 KB Created: 2021-04-07 08:37:19 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 34f05d7df9050bfd377ae4ed7b396328 SHA-1: 287a1f96ecbaa91159cab449755bddf498d3b62b SHA-256: cbc32caa490b6dbde361e5654b5922fb38f473dce104e0cccff9bd0dbe34592c
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The file is a PDF that contains an embedded URL disguised as a search result, likely to trick users into downloading a malicious payload. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were directly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URI suggest a phishing or malware distribution attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 4

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://seumenha.ru/strik?utm_term=the+five+languages+of+apology+pdf+download
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4484820/normal_5fc7a10b18f69.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4388065/normal_6012778174b2f.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4412592/normal_60421c510d5d6.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4490542/normal_600a5cd6e7595.pdf
    • https://dakurawal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135321076/nefiwun.pdf
    • https://liramuxusere.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134577046/3eb2d2ec58.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gizibiliwili/9hdY6Ho/b_ed_result_full_form.pdf
    • https://pivamaxisogen.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134481881/rivipamuposo.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/patagarinixa/bIjbHje/redarc_cable_size_and_voltage_drop_calculator.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366009/normal_601420ceb3388.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://d2faa26e-66ca-44cd-8f84-883624a71019.filesusr.com/ugd/dbbfd0_ac26343b25534e66a9e6189d0828d088.pdf?index=true
    • http://naremijex.epizy.com/37191351467.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6de85a8b-dd91-4931-8558-a37d38adfbb9/darubot.pdf
    • http://vinegufoxa.rf.gd/24403050661.pdf
    • http://dawobamam.epizy.com/23166915848.pdf
    • https://3c59ccad-08dd-474b-8af0-a42d91f20399.filesusr.com/ugd/489ff0_01763722af4e439ea46f67f930d4db55.pdf?index=true
    • http://gefetela.epizy.com/common_application_form.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/40001ea5-ff27-47a7-8700-5752d62a4c92/58501161572.pdf
    • https://0e67983c-e844-40c9-b604-97311ec94efe.filesusr.com/ugd/6e13d9_77583bfb7077445fa611f52fa69efa91.pdf?index=true
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5c2cc8cc-e276-4e9a-ad46-c281439d84c2/sentry_1250_dimensions.pdf
    • http://jizuperuxe.epizy.com/a_river_runs_through_it_movie_plot_summary.pdf
    • https://8546b567-499d-44cb-812b-f4cb210fa0cc.filesusr.com/ugd/1f0b74_e9468c002a054da8a66658f4ff85ec55.pdf?index=true
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010202.bin
a258af0d3a50068138c2f6e89470f5731e12a1b9735ef850e29714f3600b1b87		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10202 5212 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000113d0.bin
5494f5270c5bbc2f8318ea5d9cab643100e3dafe499dfe5ef5902a6aa209f876		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x113D0 11352 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00013a7f.bin
7f6049e5011acf0e8581793f2bc2bb947aac2929fdb77abc318b2a6155c1ef71		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13A7F 4324 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.