Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cbac2f8bc64ce642…

MALICIOUS

PDF

8.2 KB
MD5: 679fa0fe654afabde70805577c52d8ec SHA-1: b93793365fd773bf350bc14080fe31e5bd2748ec SHA-256: cbac2f8bc64ce6421df6f5e11adfd0e2a6b0d1988ec8adc73228f79d2c4b666f
166 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains heavily obfuscated JavaScript, identified as a multi-stage dropper. High-confidence heuristics indicate that the script is designed to decode and execute a payload, likely from an external source. The ClamAV detection further confirms its malicious nature. The presence of multiple JavaScript streams and the use of `unescape()` point to a sophisticated delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36086 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36086
  • unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
    unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Obfuscated multi-stage PDF JavaScript dropper high PDF_JS_OBFUSCATED_DROPPER
    PDF JavaScript shows 3 independent signals of exploit-kit-style multi-stage obfuscation: annot_subject_stage, incremental_eval_build, repeated_pluginschk. This is strongly consistent with pre-2011 Adobe Reader PDF droppers — OpenAction JS reads encoded data from annotation subjects, decodes it through one or more hex / base-N loops, and invokes eval indirectly (method name built one character at a time). The actual CVE is hidden in the final decoded layer and is not visible via static analysis.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN
    PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0006_000.js
f9b4659beaf681d266cfb5046d495e7b144d406eff72e71ecd4d1451ae25ca11
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 6 at offset 0x143 481 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js
913eb9b76137a6c0e5e472557279bfc5c9967f104df5bcc8900dee67af4ddf02
deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x1BD5 1682 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
deobfuscated.js
2fc15de554a571af82eba3153a40d4484237e5cd526afc05d4e1b1341094f448
deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 22550 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).