Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cb3f20a552442380…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

72.2 KB Created: 2020-09-10 09:46:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 4ff235fa8c40f76a977d74a3ef824357 SHA-1: 326b41eb860eacb0e92ba882f95df403661b41d5 SHA-256: cb3f20a55244238074c0669fe71d3d6b21f6f982769d982dfab2c63a12d13266
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell

The file contains VBA macros, specifically an AutoOpen macro that utilizes the Shell() function. This indicates an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Downloader.835b97208387fc57-OOXML-9981517-0' further supports this behavior. No specific malware family could be identified, but the technique is consistent with macro-based downloaders.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.835b97208387fc57-OOXML-9981517-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.835b97208387fc57-OOXML-9981517-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
9f3f1b734cda7577a1d3cef5f7a600581a397dc84d3fac3213e6fe8fb748fb18		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 8300 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
3d2d68fdc734ef36b6ae6ce3d41b196add6b50f9dcd4f82af0eca017aa1e50c6		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 32768 bytes

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