Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cb3c1f144acd7157…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.9 KB Created: 2021-02-13 07:56:06 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-06-04
MD5: 4437f171689a4fbb711ec5df68927170 SHA-1: 308184c3ad562ae42efe5d3ac9202f50ebad5b3a SHA-256: cb3c1f144acd715737568432c4d3867ff9a0c4349e46f98ff16be89546669fa4
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to disposable hosting and are flagged as malicious redirectors. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to redirect users to phishing or malware download sites. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains keywords related to game farming and software downloads, aligning with the link farm heuristic.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/wix?keyword=mousehunt+gold+farming+2019 In PDF document text
    • http://dronextactical.xyz/google_play_services_13.2.78_apk_uptodownk4xso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zibinileder.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134748255/1e7f52ef171.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://uggi-ugg.com/winrar_64_bit_free_trial8ij5e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xuxiropuwomo/jalTghP/85032150819.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jefaganogebe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437435/ae6926.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://astropsychology.site/xray_texture_pack_1._8._94lr7m.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/biserodafed/shdiijf/automaton_in_a_easy_sentence.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/joduragenep/6jcje5j/grand_theft_auto_gangster_download_file.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://nelifofufotilep.epizy.com/bipap_auto_bi-_flex_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sotatelovutegep.epizy.com/spotify_file_location_android.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bibuxidon.rf.gd/yearly_timeline_template_powerpoint.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e30c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE30C 5808 bytes
SHA-256: 336c62f76692bc710fedd7fa70ef299ce01c9492d7f5fb6e5de1be032ebf29fb
font_01_sfnt_off0000f6aa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF6AA 1800 bytes
SHA-256: 51ebeec29509b87aa858d500e37ac8853184703d07d1f913ce36d8e1dc7764c0
font_02_sfnt_off0000ff38.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFF38 10240 bytes
SHA-256: 5f206d0399bd413ef42b2d1d8d8a0ce395cc348f92afb6795a9cfc9b8963078e

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