PDF malware analysis — malicious · cb39f93ffd5d6593

MALICIOUS

PDF

11.8 KB

MD5: 13e25473fe9f6dc7791cc0725b2d5a1e SHA-1: eed045b1b861b535e76965a383f698a53585f94d SHA-256: cb39f93ffd5d6593bec6d49893b150939531a80c517edf6623c177433a0792e2

186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link

The PDF exploits CVE-2007-5659 using a JavaScript stager embedded within an annotation subject. This stager decodes and executes further JavaScript, as indicated by the 'PDF_JAVASCRIPT', 'PDF_JS', and 'PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER' heuristics. The ClamAV detection 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063' further confirms its malicious nature. The primary function appears to be the execution of obfuscated JavaScript, likely to download and run a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659

PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063
Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER

PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0007_000.js` `eb39e2de4dbbc100de6d3e30aa43ff78fa075618862ba1ebba5151ea3a3b848d`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D	273 bytes
`annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js` `6aaf3c89fb5dd2234d6aa572119f9591b399265469fde12e0c7c5a287d3a50ec`	deobfuscated-js	annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A	5034 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `84ed7bb044af5abfe4807a8426fe3955cf2a5a1fb14622f8466327012530f7bb`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	70992 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.