RTF malware analysis — malicious · cb1a31d98b97a786

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.0 KB First seen: 2021-06-20

MD5: 5e62e434e8d396a817a965d7f6661bf6 SHA-1: d3451662907390fe3c39f33bac2b4c0492ad76ec SHA-256: cb1a31d98b97a78648aa4966d212e1cf10f0ffe5f73dc34e26d79abe455c3596

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. This indicates the file is designed to exploit a known flaw in Microsoft Equation Editor to achieve code execution upon opening. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests an attempt to force the activation of the embedded OLE object, likely to trigger the exploit.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000083.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x83	1775 bytes
SHA-256: `d1ead2a1d977f831ca89f3a5a595d6c8c9f7bce4bfef0c26072a7530924396ae`

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