RTF malware analysis — malicious · cb0b77746f7042c5

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.9 KB

MD5: 67b96e73dbfb6962c609f637b528b642 SHA-1: bdeb3db337628035873d4401b9303e15b23c0a87 SHA-256: cb0b77746f7042c58f62bad694d84b1a7d18bf45d627e576eb9592239ff6c4fa

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, and RTF_OBJUPDATE strongly indicates an attempt to leverage a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening the document. This is a common delivery method for initial compromise.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000000ba.bin` `18e0bbe614eb218f25d7e101795a0513b1f1762b88a3c9b071dd5a0566e4d887`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xBA	1735 bytes

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