Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 caf3dbb51dd53640…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

84.0 KB First seen: 2022-08-25
MD5: f061385a7cdc2319619bb9b5772e055a SHA-1: 0e9f80a94c8e6c30e8c7f91d13d8206a42c0b7dd SHA-256: caf3dbb51dd5364012b3a8aefc4ff7f8103c85c7b2732f81b965253794548235
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The file is a password-protected Office document that exploits CVE-2017-0199. This vulnerability allows it to load a remote resource via a URL Moniker. The embedded URL, http://www.mygreatlearning.com@192.3.108.11/nmv/https_i/www.doc, is likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.mygreatlearning.com@192.3.108.11/nmv/https_i/www.doc