Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 caf1c2327a816ea8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.0 KB Created: 2021-09-03 11:18:52 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-21
MD5: e81bf2279e2a64358a5482d41652b0ea SHA-1: f0b50c9a716fa709c4a2ccd2f3b5b2b3a9f57db0 SHA-256: caf1c2327a816ea82b6b63fe503b0c4b70a1dbfc7cea94c875bcca609f72a420
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous external URIs and is identified as a link farm, with many links pointing to compromised CMS upload storage. ClamAV detected this file as Pdf.Phishing.Trojan, and ML classification strongly suggests malicious intent. The primary goal appears to be directing users to potentially malicious websites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9833

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pixomot.ru/uplcv?utm_term=fire+fighting+sprinkler+system+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://paklya.su/design/img/upload/file/pepom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://clearlakesd.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cd0db8ebdb9---buzoxerodapexigixejin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://designgaleria.hu/userfiles/file/2183423514.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ulrike-mayer.de/userfiles/files/50522939408.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fazekaskozpont.hu/images/upload/file/85206343628.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gilendor.cz/userfiles/file/46299928404.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hpworld.hu/data/pic/Image/file/85748599852.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://altonika.pro/files/fck/file/43948675316.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://morgancountyoh.com/userimages/30584572511.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://earthideasawnings.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b919fdef83c---19292711615.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://chinajessie.com/seadata/data/uploads/img/file/162764587090.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://inclinedigital.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ee3fdb79762---56616521834.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.cdscabling.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16078616225c02---56950575993.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://queuemanagementsystems.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ee30642fa59---gorugato.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://likebarcode.com/image/files/20210823_142023.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vandolderskb.com/images/usr/bodimikatipupubitipibiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mission4recruitment.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1612c7161ef0d1---99279171055.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://terralis.eu/catalogue_dynamique/file/7125017751.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kowalstwwo.pl/public/cms//images/file/45923041005.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gurukripapublicschool.org/userfiles/file/joxobejipukeruwajikaralun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tkpmission.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ca2b99446a9---jelesaloveboruru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://outsourcedbackoffice.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6c77d975c365a991dd61a57d48c81470/wokezup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lsp.od.ua/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b8oribustrdch79ol5l19ohjb4/39732048347.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nwatchonline.net/userfiles/file/21161444465.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://msr-hudsonproperties.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c00b7d127a7edbafb5c9bbe19f897fa0/futesosofamanukutapari.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ccsl.asia/files/60228226383.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lokmangal.co.in/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d5b4f6ee357e3eb23cc4832d8a8db45e/32369113845.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e0dd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE0DD 10848 bytes
SHA-256: 6b1caa83d146e9a37677a2dbdfe98f8b931e3a2bc02bc4c641cb0260c5e53f26
font_01_sfnt_off0000f974.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF974 17164 bytes
SHA-256: 6b21d0d61e39ad632a30092e36f19d29d390455ce40e7d965092be7db9d06d03
font_02_sfnt_off00012624.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12624 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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