Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 caf0d8d9ce08ca96…

MALICIOUS

RTF

787.9 KB Created: 2018-04-18 02:01:00 First seen: 2018-07-14
MD5: b96fb2b6ece415e48d50d09347b079d1 SHA-1: 23b4af20701c38911490cfb6fde6441141828876 SHA-256: caf0d8d9ce08ca96d80bd34c4233c1a9f2f5ce4b6796df7db4ea563f36d5bc6b
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple embedded OLE objects and triggers an OLE activation via \objupdate, which is a strong indicator of exploitation. The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-8759 confirms the exploitation of this specific vulnerability to achieve code execution. The embedded benign URL is not considered a malicious IOC.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 10 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002c22.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2C22 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 6e4352b58c9e607320b69ab14804e686743e7a0ef9ded754257c55911ffcb1c1
objdata_01_off00015708.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x15708 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 1e99c7a61eda727235265f37cd40ef2c8da2eeffd9b0f0b28c2d437d2bfbbcdf
objdata_02_off000281ee.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x281EE 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 76ff553daaf6360e97cbcfbb29ecf2f89ee6e7bc9f05cb9abc42fee75c789018
objdata_03_off0003acd4.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3ACD4 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 4504d6b9909e805642210a70cfa4911ea341b6008867864dcfa537478b66aa8f
objdata_04_off0004d7ba.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4D7BA 26683 bytes
SHA-256: a8783f0682597da663ff618df993324809a47398e2ab1e87baaf9dc65f0e91b5
objdata_05_off000602a7.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x602A7 26683 bytes
SHA-256: abc98cf542480911fa0f43d9f739904fc62860106c825ee29698772ace8ae0c8
objdata_06_off00072d8d.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x72D8D 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 18f811a97b1531a83839c11308109f7025d27986afd500c75e6956bdfe915e63
objdata_07_off00085873.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x85873 26683 bytes
SHA-256: b31fe4ad214125ceaf0729855b8270cefc651b7b35f6e83d3e7da69341335c29
objdata_08_off00098359.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x98359 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 5c5baaf86933f3fb9cd106b1c3c428a256e4a8dee78a0e0ff1619cea8335e847
objdata_09_off000aae3f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAAE3F 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 6b4a323ff14eeec98107e8ab5838726b94114a3d166895c70a8f4b45ea7fcf91