Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cadae8bf6a2bcf1e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.08 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2022-11-29
MD5: 6c84860292e2a4d210396b7012be9b8a SHA-1: 7061c26320bf8836b55ac660860fa0937ae8f48e SHA-256: cadae8bf6a2bcf1ee630695a250a481d22d0b6d409832f60070b118dfc3bca75
148 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE indicates the exploitation of a vulnerability within the Equation Editor OLE object. This suggests the file is designed to leverage this specific exploit to execute arbitrary code. No VBA macros were found to contain executable statements, but the presence of the Equation Editor exploit is sufficient evidence for malicious intent.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBP) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBP)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
ed8da65f0f0a4cc2a905cfcf1ae916bf05ced375ebeefae9a837c8bf84ad6699
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 3618 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
0826692ca8aaf08753f36ea3c84a0d76c210ff607c64dde8dc9fad5de26a1aa3
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD017EF325/oLe10nAtiVe 2033 bytes