Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cac731ca3082f9df…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.9 KB
MD5: 19ae31366f51b91c33186a9deb1f7afd SHA-1: 6a854efaea070bba7918b223f5b567fec245d8cf SHA-256: cac731ca3082f9dfc896fbe6000891302c563e09eea7103c6848868565d24549
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE object activation, indicating an attempt to exploit the embedded object. This strongly suggests the document is designed to leverage the Equation Editor vulnerability for arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000dd.bin
c041470f4e03fd5f754d29b56e4fb51dd1b2cf8ccd138e561749600589379543		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xDD 1658 bytes

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