Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cabb4dda19d7e032…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.3 KB Created: 2021-04-03 01:26:49 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: f47620a1e0304724efa3f564082822b3 SHA-1: c29b43be319ce4eacee3539ba6eaf21bf6c53545 SHA-256: cabb4dda19d7e032d3926b26f582dc378f7dbd58526ff401931fda699e3bd3b8
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document was identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains a significant number of external links, with heuristics suggesting it functions as a link farm on disposable hosting, likely to distribute phishing content or malware. Although no scripts were extracted, the presence of numerous external URLs points towards an attack pattern involving redirection to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9990

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://vilenefex.ru/strik?utm_term=how+long+will+a+little+buddy+heater+run+on+a+20+lb+tank
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366399/normal_600e11c55f70d.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4470222/normal_6033bf888d6fd.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4493550/normal_605f2ad1b04c8.pdf
    • https://rifuxegu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134525143/9504054.pdf
    • https://lokeduvedip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134885922/a7806aba1484be.pdf
    • http://daduriwikoniza.22web.org/37259850264.pdf
    • https://norofuzalugegok.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134882219/xekom.pdf
    • https://xafuraworeduvux.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134752052/3388923.pdf
    • https://kenojulovananav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134016885/3324943.pdf
    • https://jugivukovetid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739525/507141.pdf
    • https://viferoxabuged.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235394/kepalasoderun.pdf
    • http://yazansoft.com/kelavubinnq34j.pdf
    • https://jewaxesototipa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135326518/roxepazatofuwofej.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4481828/normal_603ebc14a30f0.pdf
    • http://scandisvet.ru/doliwim0dvg.pdf
    • https://fitisasituwag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134846324/xetar-gonered.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4368956/normal_5fe5b26e89d46.pdf
    • http://hookup153.site/87938444454n18uc.pdf
    • http://poruzur.iblogger.org/dotexuzuni.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://571cbd0a-ba82-408d-be6d-2df53a8fcfe5.filesusr.com/ugd/02af14_d247b51004314a568849baf1d94d0e29.pdf?index=true
    • https://1b6fbac1-9b66-4609-9151-81f5d4c316f7.filesusr.com/ugd/5e81b9_9cf8e9d94def4f22940409b5a64b4dd2.pdf?index=true
    • https://55963656-6eb1-4b25-bcd5-bb835d65808b.filesusr.com/ugd/0064ae_fb1031725ac24f27a72a1a82871fb06a.pdf?index=true
    • http://tudifilik.rf.gd/15261374834.pdf
    • https://be9ca920-c372-4566-b00d-544f92814f3b.filesusr.com/ugd/f0c5a9_5f5b973685364d6dad8ac7687943b194.pdf?index=true
    • https://0bc2ebcf-5b85-435c-8290-6c6350a165f2.filesusr.com/ugd/ee98f5_ed5c019cc1b74306b6c1d29c72552736.pdf?index=true
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f7c0.bin
89407ce9251df96b291f5e2033c4e2ae47f27644673de42df18816be32ca0a1c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF7C0 5544 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010aac.bin
9b89f2a65183cd6b00ebaa4482541cc385ae26a6b447d012a2f0650cbec1300b
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AAC 12044 bytes