RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · cab4c0e3c8573e0b

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

375.3 KB

MD5: 8f2ee0e105946edfc5b5deec546632db SHA-1: 2bdde8f90bf576a3ff0d3463be0d0386b49526e2 SHA-256: cab4c0e3c8573e0bc1dd1397105a47808f2a13e5ad148c185671ff5f66ccd262

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that uses OLE object embedding and auto-linking to exploit vulnerabilities and bypass security measures. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable Editing' to resolve a perceived issue with email previews, which is a common social engineering tactic. No scripts were extracted, but the OLE object activation suggests the embedded content is designed to execute malicious code.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000965.bin` `494e5adf5210e8a1013a12a1b70b55e28a8bf03162fdb0d6f84c234ea1f58ebb`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x965	79784 bytes
`objdata_01_off00007114.bin` `e032c07aaaff739b1b107cf9d955bc4909aa5f41f8325ea7731da501ec4cac81`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114	79757 bytes
`objdata_02_off0002f9bb.bin` `a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F9BB	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off00030f5e.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x30F5E	12297 bytes

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