Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 cab0ec309c8c8e4f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.8 KB Created: 2021-09-08 06:15:42 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: c857984e35e6f425a655fd0dd85f4159 SHA-1: 93636a63795b3c56955d02a02dd7ef1cb53eb467 SHA-256: cab0ec309c8c8e4f56435a5c67d1bfa33d031283584ad1bc8270d2c8001f3625
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript that references a URL, and multiple heuristics indicate it's part of a link farm designed to lead users to malicious content. The embedded script itself is metadata that mentions 'Powershell search pdf for text', suggesting an attempt to disguise or facilitate the execution of further malicious actions, likely involving PowerShell. The presence of ClamAV detection and ML classification further supports its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9980

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.nobleorthodontic.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5ba27d2ccccd28412c29d3be0e08a4dc/lazokokugolazuginede.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://nhactheducthammy.com/upload/files/98171410298.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ixtvs.de/_upload_bilder/_filemanager/file/99133046432.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.nandomoraes.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160983fc704921---70134128032.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://anyimaker.com/upload/users/files/xelijezowefopesasido.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://botosani.ro/img/uploads/file/gemegirakitosa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://geerhannutpourreussir.be/docs/upload/files/61312306704.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://andreaslasnik.com/data/files/7957822152.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pensjonatagat.pl/userfiles/file/sawadiborevux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hondaotohaiphong.vn/upload/files/4879856353.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://playgametoday.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8c2b9e69be2d72c2ce7e2c140b1c83b5/zevuxikuxasikunelaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studioturina.com/userfiles/files/16476916502.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vibrosystem.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16083b972efdb0---7126020904.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://teifsepahan.com/files/file/56497849870.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://abc-tel.ru/data/File/8973467976.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://action-roofing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0ba4a2cd873b79a758cda68924efc0f2/pamimuzujaxejibafo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anhuifan.com/upload_fck/file/2021-8-25/20210825035831727763.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dungcuruamui.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/hs2p0ig0uqjb2jr8arl485q0cv/67179325264.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kenhuffbuilders.com/userfiles/file/xabokezejipedekixikesog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aradovan.com/userfiles/file/kifisutudoravetoxarumuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ost-fogging.com/upload/files/depebewiseze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://chokmanee.com/userfiles/file/84557422040.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=powershell+search+pdf+for+textPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00012de1.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x12DE1 1640 bytes
SHA-256: 91f871e631658eb9bf31162f401dd47c68410b781e095d8398df65202edf4295
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='OpenOffice Draw'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Hixayo Yoruvi</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell search pdf for text. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Powershell search for text in array. Powershell search for text in files. Powershell</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Powershell search pdf for text. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Powershell search for text in array. Powershell search for text in files. Powershell</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell search pdf for text</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='OpenOffice Draw'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-03-28T09:22:19'
  xmp:CreatorTool='OpenOffice Draw'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='1136bdf5-ba7e-4452-bd81-aeadf744bed8'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='ba6d3972-273a-43e6-964c-cfb304027865'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000c67d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC67D 10708 bytes
SHA-256: 6a2a92f18769c527562485329f19e7a6d52ce904be41a589b6ceab6f35370db7
font_01_sfnt_off0000df61.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF61 17580 bytes
SHA-256: b93a394477e939430ae5005041e64d552444f1fd617821bdb7851e0d8bb2e10b
font_02_sfnt_off00010d98.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10D98 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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