Emotet — Office (OLE) / .XLSX malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ca9bd7cdfee03389…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

125.0 KB Created: 2006-09-15 19:15:53 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 55db81b3378d5084383d294fa947621e SHA-1: 7852487328ab178c0b66d18ee0a7e8528ff9c53b SHA-256: ca9bd7cdfee033893f24400c2e33495ec25d19eb90870bf3b85d16f32636d06d
450 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

The file is a macro-enabled Excel spreadsheet containing a fake invoice lure. The Auto_Open VBA macro is triggered upon opening, which utilizes GetObject and WMI to launch a process. This process is likely responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload from the embedded URL http://91.240.118.172/ss/hh.html, as indicated by the 'SC_STR_MSHTA' and 'SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND' heuristics. The ClamAV detection explicitly names this as an Emotet variant.

Heuristics 12

  • LOLBin reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_LOLBIN
    LOLBin reference in VBA
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.Emotet-ab81c42b2bd4747e-9951196-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.Emotet-ab81c42b2bd4747e-9951196-0
  • Reference to mshta.exe high SC_STR_MSHTA
    Reference to mshta.exe
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://91.240.118.172/ss/hh.html

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
bcbb44509bdb723596a5475460df5807276641c7860fa3733598b92dc2604030
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 10171 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.