Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ca9148d581a92e33…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

17.5 KB
MD5: acad67945f54e3e365574bad44eb3f62 SHA-1: 9ac4cae11526a0c63ef210e18d6c2bef2d3312cf SHA-256: ca9148d581a92e33b1405e2a4d63bb4e603bd4036720d17153cc3d6adba1e74a
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering a critical heuristic for Equation Editor exploitation. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED firings strongly indicates the use of the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) for arbitrary code execution. The extasciitilde{}objupdate directive further confirms that the embedded object is intended to be activated. The decoded object's class ID is 'equaTIoN.3'.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000ca2.bin
8fd676b6e95c159de3df0379a9cd6129d8543a72df2c8cbc35e0d25860b56dfc		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCA2 1910 bytes

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