Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ca67e0d8b09e4d0d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

25.6 KB First seen: 2022-11-28
MD5: 200745fa6fc0c645e8ee76ef7421844b SHA-1: 21c86fdb2c081fd36aa1cbf244067e2f17673856 SHA-256: ca67e0d8b09e4d0d2264ad0af8b3c4cc7bd2329b4a6e61e12e44424599bf3c16
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, and an \objupdate directive that forces OLE activation. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the document, which is a common technique for malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings. The embedded OLE object is likely a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000050ac.bin
a65794e9bc11828ca72310dda8382f9dcabec2035e0f8c3635edf0de9aaef69e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x50AC 1582 bytes