Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ca5fc2d073e94bd1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.4 KB
MD5: 77d3884c884845f559f13cd7bbc4583f SHA-1: c278951a1383d762debc074f8afed159cf8a8259 SHA-256: ca5fc2d073e94bd171cd01ba1f0fc48384b0821162c1acf88e8094318e781338
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates an attempt to force OLE activation, which is a common technique for exploiting this vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristics strongly suggests exploitation of the Equation Editor component.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ab.bin
33b7594eefcd658873a2a41187aa1dc2d6a501cf8473e8656784a2f89b38c49d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAB 1885 bytes