Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ca5f007eab93f325…

MALICIOUS

PDF

107.3 KB Created: 2021-09-21 19:02:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-22
MD5: 3873bb356385e86384720a37d37c07a3 SHA-1: ccea47deef6fdee0e816ad1ca0bffc77d3b3b4b4 SHA-256: ca5f007eab93f325a53631f51505aee4cc7799bffe38d11731537df950160e73
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1553.005 Security Software Installation

The sample is a PDF containing embedded JavaScript, which is a common vector for malicious activity. Heuristics indicate the document instructs users to disable security software and presents a callback lure, suggesting a phishing or tech-support scam. The presence of numerous links to external PDFs, many hosted on compromised or disposable domains, further supports a malicious intent to redirect users to potentially harmful content or phishing sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9963

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Security software disable instruction high SE_SECURITY_BYPASS
    Document instructs the user to disable antivirus or security software — unusual for ordinary documents and high-risk in an unsolicited file
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://alternativi.brtim.com/uploads/wysiwyg/files/fizalapokok.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://baruipur.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/6984695990.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studiomedicoveterinariobellucci.eu/userfiles/files/71286459768.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rothemtour.com/FileData/ckfinder/files/20210911_5449CD32985E3890.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://raylutickenterprises.com/userfiles/files/ratumu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sklenicky-obchod.cz/web/admin/fckeditor/userfiles/file/wenozipizigoman.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://suliaox.com/v15/Upload/file/2021911954286794.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://flyingkirin.com/uploadfiles/file/022054452198.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://robotsuk.com/luckingbros.co.uk/userfiles/files/85418756497.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bilbox.es/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3d5de4f19db13eb5054616b0b31262f0/13237373031.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nscenter.cn/upload/files/nunokiruselarekuwivojajeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vincityhomes.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/rvdc8u3054aut6qcnljvotnb62/9178966651.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mgmkt.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613048bdbe7ac---96317562230.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studiophotosfashion.it/userfiles/files/71718567026.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://albarossa.jp/js/upload/files/misirupoxezigemajebagig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.de.ruben.pl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/bazisilusosunuwipez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://freestyler.cz/img/file/tipijes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lawcab.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16144a2d07470a---wimogomaroziturunuba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jindi2010.com/uploadfile/files/58564659869.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://burelomdo.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/91791380209.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ruihuitax.com/files/file/29841846015.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://harekatmemuru.com/images/Media/files/mugutelajusodegovazudob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cnokorea.com/userfiles/file/fumevuxirumafesobivapaga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://counterreaction.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16147203833bdf---32493703066.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hcbarrett.com/user_area/file/24612365400.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/GLLx1DTH0VQ/uplcv?utm_term=will+rooting+my+phone+delete+everythingPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00013c65.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13C65 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0001547c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1547C 10680 bytes
SHA-256: 2965be973ed4c2dc42cf706d7f6c761adc163ddfadfc31262142fe62e9afc098
font_02_sfnt_off00016c89.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16C89 19252 bytes
SHA-256: aeacebb6848d4579d76f9694360ecbaa742ccbae90b30148a414c18fa202e616

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