Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ca5dd761a4528365…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB First seen: 2022-03-30
MD5: 5615bd29d4e4736a3927b326fb4fb279 SHA-1: 4efa6b06b51b005b052ffaa574cae3171b9ed940 SHA-256: ca5dd761a4528365529c06bcfaa378783b5cc1744536868e2cce852040e074a8
121 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics indicates that the file is designed to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component, likely leading to arbitrary code execution when the embedded object is activated. No further IOCs were extracted.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a0.bin
54b4d7530c45d904d66f139003a269f683eb95b4b6ad9e1b066f58ceac3fca31
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA0 1648 bytes