Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ca5d97e46673ae01…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

94.3 KB Created: 2008-04-23 12:48:44 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: faaa78550af48e5ed6b9138f8bad0447 SHA-1: baefff45ef652a456ffa1179d0ea76234b43a192 SHA-256: ca5d97e46673ae0143db9c812a629f2ee32349a68a030a95dea0a250da9a831f
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OLE document containing an embedded PE executable. Heuristics indicate the use of Windows API calls such as VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress, suggesting the embedded executable is likely a loader or dropper. The document body contains obfuscated text and embedded object names that hint at the nature of the embedded artifact, but no clear user-facing lure is discernible. The primary threat is the embedded executable, which is the most critical IOC.

Heuristics 8

  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 96,521 bytes but its declared streams total only 40,506 bytes — 56,015 bytes (58%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0H
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA2.crl0O
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CodeSignPCA2.crt0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/sysinternals

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_0000bc00.exe
d1741bfb314c84fc1459e02a415a8c54cf3826d56d5122e838e26650d326f852		 embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0xBC00 48393 bytes

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