Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ca31e047ae1cab60…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

76.5 KB Created: 2021-03-17 05:37:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: cdce5111dce6705e86a955a6506dc9a6 SHA-1: d379cb109578cce056a8232178eaeb4ed0e05ebc SHA-256: ca31e047ae1cab601b3566053dc3e0a2aeed52158ff437d65f0bade85fa3f3de
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros. The presence of AutoOpen, Shell(), and WScript.Shell usage indicates that the macros are designed to execute arbitrary commands. This is a common technique for downloading and executing further malicious payloads. The specific family could not be determined from the available heuristics.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
3f42e2c2f4164e3b9d21d44993246212ddd6f57ca43ceb9c56234e0b09d9690e		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3020 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
8884ba5c318acc5765e517441cff95fd1ab6fb0c6999e77df213b9940278792c		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 30208 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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