Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ca0ca64b4751d9ee…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

525.5 KB Created: 2018-10-24 03:12:08 Authoring application: Windows Installer XML (3.5.0626.0)
MD5: a3ac73e97ef6be4de439ccf497cb6a12 SHA-1: aeec0256c25a5433560778489f0cb604f8575e96 SHA-256: ca0ca64b4751d9ee8e75c9f200fb15e9ac4e8c1f35d34baee68fcc7e4a335c88
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The OLE document exhibits a significant slack space anomaly and an appended executable payload, strongly suggesting it functions as a dropper. No VBA macros were extractable due to an unsupported format, but the structural anomalies point to malicious intent. The presence of an appended payload implies the document is designed to deliver and execute a secondary malicious component.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 538,097 bytes but its declared streams total only 31,321 bytes — 506,776 bytes (94%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://microsoft.com0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crl0a
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crt0
    • http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=91955ARPNOREPAIRARPNOMODIFYemptyfalseJoltVersionSOFTWARE\Microsoft\Silverlight[FullVersion
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0X
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0T
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crl0^
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crt0��
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/docs/primarycps.htm0@

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