PDF malware analysis — malicious · ca06d494f9e1ecff

MALICIOUS

PDF

14.2 KB

MD5: 6f446de0d34b68b2d4e82b4e6eb4fa20 SHA-1: 1b20edf3198a0ac1085db23fb7eb1c4cb933085b SHA-256: ca06d494f9e1ecff02b067e7a5f4a1f22623719217e519b422f0a075832577c5

124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical ClamAV detection and high heuristic firing for 'PDF_XFA_TITLE_BASE26_EVAL_STAGER' indicate the PDF is designed to exploit vulnerabilities. The presence of an embedded URL further suggests a download and execution chain. The XFA form and button actions are likely used to trigger the exploit, leading to the download of a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962
XFA title base-26 eval stager high PDF_XFA_TITLE_BASE26_EVAL_STAGER

PDF XFA initialize script reads an encoded payload from the document title, builds event.target.eval and String.fromCharCode from string fragments, decodes base-26 character pairs, and evals the recovered stage. This is an exploit-kit staging pattern; the static bytes do not prove a specific CVE by themselves.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON

PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0041.bin` `c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0x2AE0	85 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0042.bin` `dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0x2B92	1029 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0043.bin` `d7f7bd6434fff4670f50233bfe5cf596fac9d4d44d97771942e495ed6801d5e8`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 43 at offset 0x2DAB	1949 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0044.bin` `3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x3232	144 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0045.bin` `10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x32DE	77 bytes

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