Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ca02725af7102c14…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

75.5 KB Created: 2021-03-23 04:27:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 943a36eebebde8c430478b43317b0ef4 SHA-1: 2db96bd0c6f6ff3e1c2754e686e7f280a3770b41 SHA-256: ca02725af7102c1451cd5a678d58d81270746961c97f483f15d725d39c196c62
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The OOXML document contains VBA macros, specifically an AutoOpen macro, which is a strong indicator of malicious intent. The presence of Shell() and WScript.Shell usage within the VBA code suggests the macro is designed to execute arbitrary commands, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The extracted artifact 'macros.bas' and the 'vbaProject_00.bin' further confirm the presence of VBA code. No specific family could be identified, but the execution pattern is common for droppers.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
6636b79027b255440689ac68cbe3b7c59da784ee2da34fd8cf80b9d80c5549e4		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4533 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
aaf3ef1e8de9694411aa2f3881b24fd5ac2aa480dcbe314611117c0f020008cc		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 27648 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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