Win.Trojan.Vampire-10 — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c9fdbca5c682a528…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

44.5 KB Created: 1997-05-27 02:46:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word for Windows 95 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: 7ea08938cdc5c76dd70b32e5a0915677 SHA-1: 76b32e6b3a7efcefac61d86483bbfe9fa774e09a SHA-256: c9fdbca5c682a5283143e18e342f3235c6a493c70b04711024cf0165256e29b2
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Win.Trojan.Vampire-10 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file exhibits characteristics of a legacy WordBasic macro virus, specifically identified by the 'TOOLSMACRO' marker and ClamAV detection as 'Win.Trojan.Vampire-10'. The embedded OLE structure also shows anomalies, indicating potential obfuscation or corruption designed to evade analysis. The presence of embedded file paths like 'C:\VBA97.doc' suggests the macro may attempt to interact with or drop files in specific locations.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Vampire-10 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Vampire-10
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUS
    OLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. OLE file is 20,460 bytes but its declared streams total only 0 bytes — 20,460 bytes (100%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00006214.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x6214 20460 bytes
SHA-256: 12bb34233072a8e0e15824348b4243ebde50b961fce8862257377db9f27ffd83
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Vampire-10
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely