Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c9e13a8e4288fd05…

MALICIOUS

PDF

93.5 KB Created: 2021-08-02 12:50:46 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: 6b47731c42bc0b159d98be1541641944 SHA-1: 3c5c7bb581d8171d8c42bd9d111756a4aa9f9a44 SHA-256: c9e13a8e4288fd051670eb6e13d5c9c290920f204b86c7c5fd0da3239eadc132
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous links to external websites, many of which are hosted on compromised CMS platforms or disposable domains, indicating a likely phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm heuristics point towards an attack pattern designed to redirect users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9932

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bostoncake888.com/UserFiles/files/kovefixomumemaka.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://kinogigant.com/sadm_files/91666579541.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nktrading.qa/file/files/gojejal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://puppometalli.eu/file/92536939328.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://uniquehotelsolutions.com/files/others/jonafexizovexif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://reicar.dk/userfiles/file/35761748174.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://seamcc.com/UserFiles/files/mexenuxovaviwenotefivifi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://andana.us/files/files/2971741853.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://paymentsbusiness.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cf4466596e---botumanuxodizegeduv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mmszke.hu/files/file/96556308359.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hypnotiseur.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075c60812d36---18338726654.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rsun.pro/admin/ckfinder/userfiles/files/fezofepuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://haai.org/upload/file/73736674393.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5llmvu5h2t0av3lavk3nemcui7/88472908731.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bukharaatlanta.com/sites/default/files/file/ginekogubavumin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cukrarnakolbaba.eu/obrazky/files/midufazulitajurira.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mobistore.co.nz/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0e6b70358c2c038c27f6307655efac70/84489070955.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://binhvi.com/upload/files/34750565496.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.hcibatiment.fr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b656a3fb26---70854553547.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sesc.com.ua/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/iaqrgv952ol5ss4p2lqpdsb0h2/wefosuvasasew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sacc-la-chaux-de-fonds.ch/fichiers/file/gonene.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.bestlifepolicy.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608f84c53a621---nigetusupegekeki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://atek-ent.com/upload/file/5169863238.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://corianderedmonton.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/80280669097.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://eurogeographyjournal.eu/admin/fckfiles/file/76540035286.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.zopfitravel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a0f4004c5c5---lovedawetanujun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=kickin+it+full+episodes+season+2+episode+17PDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010571.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10571 10920 bytes
SHA-256: d6cce39380988318bcbf39b0803bacc63e3f1932588c9feb1c6889daeb219754
font_01_sfnt_off00011efa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11EFA 17624 bytes
SHA-256: c228a1dfb947747dbf7a256b03065da77b66cc631d6aeb1b8963111f6cf8c1de
font_02_sfnt_off00014d0e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14D0E 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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