Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c9cb1d63e4380c1e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.7 KB Created: 2020-11-03 18:23:16 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: 0f81ca3add6269a244c25ba1709a09b0 SHA-1: ebce926684b92c6c6370431d56fccd868ac504f3 SHA-256: c9cb1d63e4380c1ed614380362295641a982cdbe1f81c86548399a41cb7b5533
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to disposable hosting services and one identified as a malicious redirector. This indicates a link farm designed to distribute traffic to various external resources, potentially for phishing or malware distribution. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=lisa+guyer+music In PDF document text
    • https://vixeroniwemeful.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740086/lupolavumixulad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kinimozudex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134498073/dobijageziwinukilox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wepugimi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070973/sanufiruwula-nuxagadedanureg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://meboguvogo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437667/1018917.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4404123/normal_5fa08321d6458.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4426279/normal_5f9f59c7b62c6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pesajupamobe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607203/9399046.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nevikafujar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134380077/junamor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tetazino/barycentre_de_deux_points_exercices_corrigs.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wuzalugiseto/pdf_to_word_program_converter.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4ce63e01-ecba-4e44-b500-2968c517f932/shooting_an_elephant_questions_and_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f9ec34d4-b85f-459a-94ed-48c7d8e46fe7/71575833728.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006299.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6299 5128 bytes
SHA-256: d0d8da4195df77ee4af99281c349c54ee3b8bb46207f840d513eb85e9259347b
font_01_sfnt_off00007405.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7405 11656 bytes
SHA-256: bfd2dd9106cc7ead3579ff4052c06f0a5744ae9ad38af3665b8dc60e419763e9

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