Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c9a11ceb5fc09797…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

31.1 KB First seen: 2023-05-05
MD5: 42412500a8a7e0550d6e090af44d72d5 SHA-1: 490f8c21995ac07bb548eec6de5b275db572ab66 SHA-256: c9a11ceb5fc09797340d8809330d898ce77ed25a2136003f1cce668a8caa10d8
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model

The file is an RTF document containing OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, a common tactic for malware droppers. The embedded OLE object data is highly suspicious and likely contains the exploit code.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005634.bin
e262175d5929705d6370972367be3e1ef1e0f12f8b9e1f70e0113310ac373b9c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5634 1628 bytes