Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c991bc336f49e52a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

829.0 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 249660b0e3ee6fa3d3470989e96cbdb2 SHA-1: 9adae7fed71f886f176a3fb4c9ea88a72c60b1f5 SHA-256: c991bc336f49e52ace65e45576fb1ada5eab87571b7a332732f2dd9fe8703ab7
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). This indicates an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor to execute arbitrary code upon opening. The presence of ".objupdate" further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, making it difficult to determine the exact payload or user-facing lure.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000c65c9.bin
e85187963882140808f1d35591bc16c6dec79af2749db36f40e0179d9f309d16		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC65C9 3739 bytes

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