Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c98a6e0e8b814301…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.1 KB Created: 2021-06-10 12:18:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-23
MD5: 76145312517c4a043c4932e03102d603 SHA-1: 80c37dd83ae776f3d2b19a3504f20f36a3a8787e SHA-256: c98a6e0e8b814301b9d694e62dc6a1f7877de225d669b64489b2d52c3c0d71f1
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file exhibits characteristics of a phishing lure, employing a link farm strategy to direct users to download potentially malicious content. The heuristics indicate malformed streams and numerous external URIs, many hosted on compromised WordPress sites, suggesting an attempt to obscure the true destination and leverage trusted infrastructure. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://chcial.ru/uplcv?utm_term=practical+english+usage+free+download PDF link annotation
    • https://nhaban24h.com.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8kajr0tjqqljgd1cr0ij6mqbhr/32249340232.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.engltg.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/526f54fca0f65497e91594294a6cfd15/lesajizagurepeliwiguluk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kraljicabih.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bf931fd824e---nerupunabifevefukodeduket.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://becro-plast.hr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a75b3bd8ad4---43515584201.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://agilitynd.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e1b89625aa5b83687b4b9407bebbd897/lokegipu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nicemexico.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16085d7e4bdce9---31902390681.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://klingende-zeder.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160837f093fc61---mozafeduditobufijiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.dyna-tech.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609a60d2c20ae---56953033236.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vetranhtuongmamnon.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/p8vlrka6n8kratmlpimltsk5f2/10102021343.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mfplus.ba/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a745bb47df3---57141512074.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://polinagerz.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8af6dvtcqlga144754pon2vd7u/diwufilufavazisipa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.theflightfest.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607ac3ab82918---870466205.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bentzendesign.se/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160790cb6cd94f---titanejulajuvufolapawe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://olterus.com/contents//files/rirowigiwuxewo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cremeconferences.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6d694ebe0e98add8a3b6128a3961d30a/21323338970.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://microfocus-realize2020mea.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/01ac60292845779983662063370156a3/bodesutimara.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://atraba-holding.com/userfiles/file/59356821840.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d05f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD05F 5376 bytes
SHA-256: 78af3b7017598bbc368f8df7d2248e01f90e09bc6b031818101876aff0c7ea67
font_01_sfnt_off0000e2ad.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE2AD 11220 bytes
SHA-256: 28d62d8eb9c16166cdf2976d1b9d17d1195d203263b6867fb06d6a1bea1a86fd
font_02_sfnt_off0001095a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1095A 16204 bytes
SHA-256: 541fa2b6826b0add99b7d5a173ef1e6a5567607b5192f75b810eb17d6a563501

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