Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c977b861b887a099…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

4.70 MB Created: 2021-08-18 21:14:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: bcfcf7492bfeb307fe89128eba138479 SHA-1: 3d823a3f25c5c898310c38af82911d98af22e524 SHA-256: c977b861b887a09979d4e1ef03d5f975f297882c30be38aba59251f1b46c2aa8
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is a package (Ole10Native) that carries an executable file, strongly suggesting an attempt to exploit CVE-2026-21514. The document also contains a lure to enable macros, a common technique for malware droppers. The embedded OLE object itself is the primary IOC, as it likely contains the second-stage payload.

Heuristics 5

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
64635f54326c180c6461b9b71065f81e79e40e18459aff728eaea943b3259a04		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 6515200 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
c7aea1776f8fd55869643dde8ef26cddb151afb0890a9f293f13a1bed77015b1		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 6461498 bytes
emf_00.emf
30921c30222934ff7cc4eb44d4e23634d63eb7534d9476697842a7e1c8e4bccb		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 18060 bytes

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