Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c9731ed54f222f4a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

173.5 KB First seen: 2022-09-14
MD5: 251d9c6e6f158b654e9f950361257cfc SHA-1: c764cc8ea9a2dcfb4f50716f3047995866a15aea SHA-256: c9731ed54f222f4ae09b64346a420f5366bd253f43306a7be795137aa1e08106
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The sample is an encrypted Office document that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via a URL Moniker to load a remote document. The embedded URL points to a likely second-stage payload. The document is password-encrypted, preventing direct analysis of its content.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://dummy_usersssss@192.210.201.56/...----------......................--------------/www_g/http.doc

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