Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c94b5271da136547…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.13 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 839fc02d716c2f0bbbbf5d1964323cba SHA-1: b10865db9c6c7a9eabfd120c36a3749cbf955245 SHA-256: c94b5271da136547006f30f1a8d5b3390e21a2444d8055e5bef97396475f4593
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor, indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution, which is likely used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics further supports the exploitation of embedded objects for malicious purposes.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off002153e2.bin
0a9bc0a167426b1288474f9119a940c042eadfdfa64175a224117f871b0a3277
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2153E2 3732 bytes