Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c90f236edc364585…

MALICIOUS

PDF

549.2 KB Created: 2021-08-07 02:21:42 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: ce539629aa717359b7590c066d88be48 SHA-1: da228fefccc9e226af2dcaca9c6e536407188964 SHA-256: c90f236edc364585a81f74780d24800c27c54cbb271197fbbb3eb55b97e10be0
374 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell

This PDF document exhibits multiple high-risk social engineering lures, including impersonating Microsoft to trick users into downloading a fake Windows Server ISO, and instructing users to interact with remote support tools or install browser extensions. The presence of multiple links to potentially compromised CMS upload storage further indicates a malicious intent to distribute further payloads. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.7542

Heuristics 12

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • Remote-support tool lure high SE_REMOTE_SUPPORT_LURE
    Document instructs the user to install, open, or connect with a remote-support tool such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or ScreenConnect — high-risk in an unsolicited document
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=windows+server+2012+r2+download+iso+64+bit+with+crack+kickass.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.skupp.pl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084168059561---gifogasiwolibi.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://www.luminicaambiental.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160db4c60dd034---64569078452.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://drairtools.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/tokufipevizuzinegi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.beewellrx.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/tmp/kopupapibipaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://winston-woodward.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4408c1afe4932fa7985743042a72e875/51732383928.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://careerhack.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16073bc1646b9f---pasiwuluzamizegipe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.gabrielamaciel.net/images/content/file/11224863310.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alatheir.com/atheirwsfiles/file/21396635936.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bentzendesign.se/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16079210c06247---83107311876.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wang023spa.com/userfiles/202106file/2021061718353670554.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stonebreaker.at/47148883671.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kayapaliinsaat.net/file/12501179493.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.atrium-tuiles.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160902dd7c9a15---zamamijufiwolotiko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarmisir.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0ttai0iqltd55vqlbhjhu2aka5/90909340151.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rosemonttherapy.health/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5fnfij51nshl5a34n43g0cvs5g/riwufevo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://svenstavik.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160875048b8c3b---lipiwapubezebi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://capitaloffice.pl/fotki/file/76173061497.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pressvaluation.net/userfiles/file/6685295910.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://verkoop-je-wagen.be/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16098416588475---91133706032.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://suseefinance.com/userfiles/file/36921343146.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://totalfinance.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608536d2d32ba---17612523019.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.fecomerciomg.org.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607043b75d3ed---xijivevuxuvaxepole.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ksiclub.org/projects/achievemore/admin/upload/fckImages/file/gurajajaxomitukigapajape.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://oneself.pro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608a173ce3997---sujirurafifexibifufa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://resortvillairene.it/userfiles/files/88844421026.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=windows+server+2012+r2+download+iso+64+bit+with+crack+kickassPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000801ac.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x801AC 11384 bytes
SHA-256: 6d17bc2f017aad9d048d6d26efb7cca9ed76b8b7f26270da10485f5221326c2f
font_01_sfnt_off00081c97.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x81C97 33040 bytes
SHA-256: b637bd278a817e550e17c5b4036d19d9e8acd3f1924adaed6a92db6b9ae24f87
font_02_sfnt_off00086bbd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x86BBD 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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