Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c90b58cd6ad677e4…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

226.9 KB
MD5: cd8d2aa32ff731473b05c1e4037f0a45 SHA-1: 32b11770866d2e7df1f4118e433acbb2d0badfe3 SHA-256: c90b58cd6ad677e45f1914cec5210faef897e739ab833d7bf4db0913440db7b5
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1137.003 Libary Loading

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with heuristics indicating automatic linking and update triggers. This suggests the document is designed to exploit OLE object activation to execute embedded code, likely a second-stage payload. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further supports this, as the document likely contains instructions to enable content, a common lure for macro-based malware delivery.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
af5b212a3e7797370d36390ced6beb9bce6ee44472c1000c23b00fe2a070f64f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 19476 bytes
objdata_01_off0000a844.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA844 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000bde7.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBDE7 12297 bytes