PDF malware analysis — malicious · c8feaf6dd14dbdbb

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.8 KB Created: 2020-11-25 10:12:14 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27

MD5: ee84c22d68467574d63894133f570b97 SHA-1: 43b904ee5014a0670bc6e08cbbf1a316e4b6f14c SHA-256: c8feaf6dd14dbdbbf9274c276c2a627ed8797aeb8ce441b22798a5898910cd7d

244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains numerous embedded links, with at least one pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure and others forming a link farm on disposable hosting. The document body is heavily obfuscated and appears to be junk data, suggesting the primary purpose is to host these links rather than convey information.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK

PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM

Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM

Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL https://traffmen.ru/123?utm_term=elmwood+palace+theater+movie+times In PDF document text
- https://motuzepiruwilo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134348631/54d534f736.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://vonubaxuted.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452839/60eb081a5bc0a.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://ribapapa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134479292/foxobojo.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://zimiduninu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637103/waxadi_tozanidiba_fabosizakiru_zazit.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://jemiwuwavaza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814288/bibesekukemugedovofa.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://birivuben.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134618962/bemaremiverejitada.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://wepeweguwerixum.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856135/26d3397.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://fatuzolawodazu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134730183/6509407.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://zepixufiguw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134108583/xorije_vanajozivimor_pujajagorefenob.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://zidabowejixu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163559/8678239.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://silukijexopul.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134868047/zepotezamif.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
- http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/99b98532-0a7c-4a21-a8a3-8095874ea60e/al_arabiyah_baina_yadaik.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/709a6d0c-e22d-4429-b961-9525b8f9e2e7/virafedok.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/xeruxaxer/93570786878.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f576a1eb-ea1b-46f3-9e45-276c230d29f5/45600055838.pdfIn PDF document text
- https://s3.amazonaws.com/wutezigojuxi/pilomumowovexume.pdfIn PDF document text
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
- http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`font_00_sfnt_off0000ee85.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE85	5104 bytes
SHA-256: `ebe5857b48eba7f882af3509cdcbd5ff191803e9efaa66b5c6209546837bbacf`
`font_01_sfnt_off0000fffc.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFFFC	10360 bytes
SHA-256: `2f9744a3508cc033f79a758f45e8d44630261ecda42c98921e7fb835c7cf4fa3`
`font_02_sfnt_off0001237e.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1237E	4324 bytes
SHA-256: `b50a2106bf82917db0cd3cf88f63c5e8cc3298b343ace5cffc591b35df33d24c`

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