RTF malware analysis — malicious · c8dd30d6b2c29dc5

MALICIOUS

RTF

304.6 KB First seen: 2020-05-25

MD5: f3983181143d1a76bc87c7648f9d2a03 SHA-1: 6db482dbf8ad3e705a232083d3e332f19849167e SHA-256: c8dd30d6b2c29dc56da864e6767961d2a3411833075b340024a55c18cc8a2731

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object related to Equation Editor, specifically triggering CVE-2017-11882. This exploit is known to execute arbitrary code, indicating the file's purpose is to deliver and run a malicious payload. The high entropy of the decoded OLE object further supports the presence of an executable payload.

Heuristics 5

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000008a.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x8A	155873 bytes
SHA-256: `90c4547f1fe0c5ab7a98464a2cc447bbc655747380b47c01c98051b7ec2bf6bc`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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