Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c8b763a67ca79181…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

227.2 KB
MD5: e538863215a2f541e94ee8a271afd3fe SHA-1: 48334cc0f402ff90b457011d5ff9310bb81d2d12 SHA-256: c8b763a67ca7918191cec90d60fa8a915d9c182f87095a447f60e1177d2ee828
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to trigger execution upon opening. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to enable content, a common tactic for macro-based droppers. While no specific scripts were extracted, the OLE object structure strongly suggests the document's purpose is to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
ecf2e09752cb06c3223e2046e6c2247e90e35456648270e2b35f619f0f730a76
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 19609 bytes
objdata_01_off0000a958.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA958 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000befb.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBEFB 12297 bytes