Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c88720a37735aab4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.4 KB Created: 2021-03-18 02:50:11 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-07-02
MD5: 216414280e9299903ee2d12d4fe6e7c7 SHA-1: 04b30bc8f0e44c386ebf4934086a4e5a36d1620a SHA-256: c88720a37735aab4ce1da9f401d8806cb7b0ed622ffa074447d84d59e384e275
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable domains, which is characteristic of SEO spam or a phishing campaign. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to redirect users to malicious sites or download further payloads. No scripts were extracted, but the structure and URL patterns suggest a phishing or link-farming attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://druttle.ru/wix?keyword=ng+worksheets+pdf PDF link annotation
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jijasitov/aDghggi/nibupogijebadolojidazen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wolowivem/RDjbzhh/zowirizakelajulunafoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vosujesu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134646347/9cc5d99679a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4459630/normal_604aa0903964b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4412173/normal_5fe0294b34b3b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kujufemom/geheNgc/dungeons_and_dragons_online_best_classes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lofusomibebez.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740423/4399765.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pomulopegodetom.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384256/zatepilufelozo-zidoz-kulabimuxafed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tuxisilogok/lYgfgeY/5368695560.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kasavakujosi/YiaZp61/vikuxaturadasuvozuvorej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4467038/normal_6052513df307a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4476936/normal_5fc7cfa0c53d5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4464070/normal_6040c1235515c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zarojapejafaro.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135347044/9724529.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://8ee4d174-735f-4cd7-9396-c3a65dbcc337.filesusr.com/ugd/5ac313_60bf9cfd052d4d3ebc058e7ecd83c355.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://b7eb3c74-9f10-4efd-a612-efb7ea03662f.filesusr.com/ugd/7198c1_d917eccbbdc7479bbcde838fa56d9ef4.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://bff5fdab-9fd0-4670-908b-a1308bb5a9cb.filesusr.com/ugd/227d0f_10a62a751df249cb8dc6545dc50c7377.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://8ecf7690-1f99-4e28-a4b6-3228ba9731d7.filesusr.com/ugd/63d3ad_7644806b8abc4810ada3188d010a1b95.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://000bb656-a8cb-4e8b-9327-0b0ec99f56fe.filesusr.com/ugd/3f812e_166dc13bb9cd4b9e9049df8872c1182f.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://e8b42f19-2b74-4cfe-b8b8-726941c8cf7e.filesusr.com/ugd/253000_fe6ac225cd1747be975eb017c5ef4739.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://ca6b24e6-01cd-4368-a310-1df05077a315.filesusr.com/ugd/11b39a_1999278e1f6648fcbe2dd314e6e53a55.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://77483064-5892-4b52-b419-66e751946b77.filesusr.com/ugd/ef7b09_3b2fdf2d3ac34caaae0dcfe1cdf990f0.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://a72a44ae-2aae-4d6a-a6c4-235301d0a62e.filesusr.com/ugd/57436b_02a6903481db4682b919ee2f9ee633cf.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f64d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF64D 5184 bytes
SHA-256: 80688797b59e90732790c61e7bcb14eba27176e8bc91276b84667f6e1265c7d8
font_01_sfnt_off00010813.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10813 10620 bytes
SHA-256: 34b19cb00767c390184e1dc4579c57f77184eba6329a1505e77f75606d60c947

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.