Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c87a24accd23f12f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.31 MB
MD5: 33a4f2ef4b20c707500c9e620fa8c426 SHA-1: 2965681540012b5bfbdb7490b23a59c73ee7faee SHA-256: c87a24accd23f12fee2cfcd53b01fe23f06247100b9a8c6026ab398cf5dcd68d
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is an OOXML document that is encrypted with a default password and contains embedded OLE objects, specifically identified as Equation Editor objects. This strongly suggests it is designed to exploit vulnerabilities within the Equation Editor component to achieve code execution.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.