Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 c8698df153b3a52e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.7 KB Created: 2020-10-30 14:33:49 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-04
MD5: 489dd09e35f733ee9a8de4e5f0df5ead SHA-1: 9b472a234e613061b45761dd951d2792f074cea4 SHA-256: c8698df153b3a52ea03c2e75a83b56a239514b22ada1e19847674de0f2712d2e
184 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier. The file embeds a large number of external links characteristic of an SEO link farm and routes users through malicious redirector infrastructure. Specific URLs and indicators for this sample are listed in the indicators section.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/aws?keyword=white+house+ranks In PDF document text
    • https://lurukise.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134454795/jamejuralukovupomaku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nisutezobeta.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134486685/fezigati_rikopafovuteku_pemivimijamena_pilipazul.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gogebuzavoriro.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681212/1392253.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://liwevapazu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071299/fusipanobopofol_kowelen_suwulavajis_gigexinexu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4420036/normal_5f970b0b697f4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://luwamagol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134375262/befozusobigisewo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zalawevovupat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969727/204217.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zelidewa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134371532/rezebelim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nobozufale.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134322784/16a1034d585.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sukowaletudevux.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874669/davemulomof_tozoligejevajob_fenajor_pavatar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9ca4f7fe-0dfc-43ba-898a-008390829d72/82583894138.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9c2ee475-a033-4ac5-b4d5-3f6e2282f46b/zaguwefi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0504/9601/2450/files/wisivupemosagudetanogamoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0483/5580/3299/files/truth_about_mohammed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006e99.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E99 4816 bytes
SHA-256: 2bbbfd9f65ca875fbda3f8fa39d808f0fb51f4cfd89b13d411b6b4e26d3b23af
font_01_sfnt_off00007f01.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7F01 11640 bytes
SHA-256: 68c86c7659f1e173473d6dd770616fccdad727079b7664a9b284b6c93a02fd25

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